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Beyond the Veil of Ignorance: An Analysis of Global Regulations for Assisted Suicide 
and the Guided Next Steps for America 
Abigail B. Coogan 
Professor Christina Dewhurst, Department of Justice Studies 
Abstract: The concept of assistance in dying goes back to the ancient Greco-Roman 
world, but it is still a topic of much debate today. This paper attempts to address this 
debate by completing a thorough examination of the topic of assisted dying in America. It 
begins with a thorough examination of assisted dying through the legal lense of the 
United States Constitution and court decisions, moves into an analysis and rebuttal of 
common objections regarding assisted dying, and examines assisted dying regulations 
around the world in order to examine what qualities are important in developing assisted 
dying regulations, along with what should be avoided. Through this analysis and the legal 
conclusion that assisted dying is, in fact, constitutional, this paper finally structures the 
outline for a plan of regulations that should be included in the legalization of assisted 
suicide in the Unites States in order to make sure that the process is implemented in a 
way that allows for freedom, autonomy, and equality to be properly maintained. Assisted 
dying is much more than an impersonal debate, however. It’s a human issue. The hope is 
that this paper would convince readers and legislators that the legalization of assistance in 
dying is necessary not only from a legal standpoint, but from the human standpoint of 
allowing those who are suffering to die a humane and peaceful death on their own terms. 
Keywords and Phrases: Assisted Dying; Assisted Suicide; Death with Dignity; United 
States; Constitutionality; Regulations; Legislation; Analysis 
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Across cultures and times, death has been looked at as a taboo topic. Turn the 
death into a suicide and talk will turn into whispers and sideways glances. And make that 
suicide into one assisted by another person and it will become an underdiscussed, hidden-
in-the-shadows matter of controversy. People tend to avoid that which makes them 
uncomfortable, and yet these uncomfortable topics are precisely the ones that need to be 
talked about most. Accordingly, in order to solve the ongoing debate of whether or not a 
person has the right to die, or a right to assisted suicide, it must be talked about, analyzed, 
and put out in the open for the world to see.  
The first statutorily sanctioned assisted suicide was that of Bob Dent, who lived in 
Australia (Fraser & Walters, 2000). Before he died, Bob Dent dictated a letter to his wife 
explaining his decision, and in it he described his life as an “...incontinent, pain-racked, 
totally dependent existence exacerbated by watching the suffering of his wife as she 
cared for him. He stated that he was ‘immensely grateful’ that he could end his life in a 
dignified and compassionate manner” (Fraser & Walters, 2000). This letter serves as a 
stark reminder that when discussing the topic of assisted suicide, it’s not just a matter of 
law and hypothetical issues that could arise; it’s a matter of real human lives and people 
who are truly suffering in ways that most of us couldn’t even imagine. 
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         In this paper, I aim to start an open and honest conversation to bring the very real 
issue of assisted suicide to light. A detailed examination of the United States 
Constitution, decisions by the US Supreme Court, and other legal sources will show that 
there is, in fact, a right for a person to end their life on their own terms. Then other 
common, non-constitutionally based objections to the legalization of assisted dying will 
be examined. Detailed comparisons of assisted suicide regulations throughout the world 
will show the many existing ways that other countries have handled this issue, because 
while the United States has not yet recognized assisted suicide as a right, there are other 
countries that have. Further analysis of these regulations will contribute to a discussion of 
inherent problems that can arise in this type of legislation, as well as proposed solutions 
to these problems. And finally, a culmination of this research will result in a proposition 
for the best next steps that the United States can take in order to ensure that its citizens 
can exercise this right to assisted suicide in a safe, regulated, and carefully monitored 
fashion that will ensure that the essential foundations of freedom, equality, and autonomy 
are maintained. 
         Assisted suicide is not the typical suicide case. While definitions may vary, 
assisted suicide can generally be defined as “a deliberate intervention undertaken with the 
express intention of ending a life, to relieve intractable suffering” (Khan & Tadros, 
2013). The piece about intractable suffering is precisely what makes the debate over 
assisted suicide an entirely different one from any debate over the typical suicide case. 
An argument for assisted suicide is not an argument that citizens of the United States, or 
citizens of any country for that matter, possess an innate right to have assistance in 
ending their life for just any reason. Instead, it is an argument that addresses the right of 
3 
 
 
 
people who are already dying and in pain to have a humane death on their own terms. 
Moving forward, this paper will examine the issue of assisted suicide purely through the 
lense of these types of cases. 
 
LEGALITY 
 Before anything further can be said about assisted suicide in the United States, the 
legality of such a proposition must first be examined. The law of the land in the United 
States is its constitution, and the legality of anything within the country must be 
interpreted through this document. However, the United States Constitution does not 
cover every possible circumstance or issue that will ever occur, and instead provides an 
overarching idea of rights and freedoms guaranteed to the American people. This is why 
the judicial branch of the US government exists. It’s entire purpose is to interpret laws 
and the Constitution to figure out how they could apply to the many different 
circumstances that arise that are not directly addressed in the Constitution. With this in 
mind, when examining whether or not a national legalization of assisted suicide would be 
legal under the Constitution, examining what the Supreme Court has said is a good first 
step.  
 The two Supreme Court cases that most directly address the legality of assisted 
suicide itself are Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, and in both cases, the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of state-level statutes that prohibited assisted 
suicide (Keown, 1997). Gonzalez v. Oregon is another case that partially addresses the 
idea of assisted suicide, but it moreso addresses the “...technical matters of administrative 
rule making and statutory interpretation… [rather than] ‘the profound issues of 
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professional ethics and personal autonomy that have animated the national debate’ over 
physician-assisted suicide” (Mathes, 2006). Because it does not address the legality of the 
actual act of assisted suicide, which is what this paper is intended to focus on, this case 
will not be discussed. 
 In Washington v. Glucksberg, a group of doctors, seriously ill patients, and an 
organization counseling those who were considering physician assisted suicide 
challenged a state statute forbidding assisted suicide on the grounds that it violated “...the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by infringing a liberty interest of 
competent, terminally-ill patients to commit [physician assisted suicide]” (Keown, 1997). 
In Vacco v. Quill, it was argued that a different state statute prohibiting assisted suicide 
was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
“By allowing terminally-ill patients on life-support machines to hasten their deaths by 
directing their removal, but prohibiting other terminally-ill patients from having their 
deaths hastened by their doctors… New York law favored the former group of patients 
over the later” (Keown, 1997). In both cases, the Supreme Court upheld the state statutes 
and did not find it a violation of citizen’s fourteenth amendment rights for states to have 
laws prohibiting assisted suicide (Keown, 1997). 
 It would seem at first glance that this would be the end of the conversation; it’s 
not a violation of the constitution for states to prohibit assisted suicide, so therefore there 
couldn’t be a constitutional right to assisted suicide. However, while this view may seem 
correct, this type of conclusion is a grossly basic and misinformed view of the court 
system, Supreme Court rulings, and constitutional interpretation. While judges are not 
supposed to be political, there is no denying that rather than being completely impartial, 
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the Supreme Court, and any other court system, is undoubtedly a political animal. 
Constitutional interpretation, whether by a regular person or by a Supreme Court Justice, 
is just that: interpretation. And there is more than one way to interpret a document that is 
left intentionally ambiguous. In fact, in this era, it is considered normal for presidents to 
nominate judges to the Court based on their specific views of Fourteenth Amendment 
issues, and “Accusations that judges engage in judicial activism- in politics rather than 
law- are commonplace” (Ziegler, 2018). 
 Other than the obvious factor of whether a judge tends to lean liberal or 
conservative, there are generally two theories subscribed to when it comes to 
constitutional interpretation. The first is originalism, which, as described by the former 
Justice Scalia, is a view that “... a written constitution has a fixed meaning which does not 
change with time and that such meaning of the text is the same as the words signified 
when the constitution was first adopted” (Kirby, 2000). The second is a view of the 
Constitution as a living document where “The meaning and content of the words take 
colour from the circumstances in which the words must be understood and to which they 
must be applied” (Kirby, 2000). Whether the Court is filled with judges who interpret the 
Constitution by looking to the Founder’s original intent or who interpret it as a living 
document that changes and advances with the world around it has a tremendous impact 
on how cases are decided. Many Americans know about the decision of Brown v. Board 
of Education where the Supreme Court ruled that the idea of “separate but equal” was 
unconstitutional. Many years earlier, the Court ruled the exact opposite, but the opinion 
changed once a new group of Justices examined and interpreted the Constitution. This is 
only one example of many in the United States where the Court, filled with a different 
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group of Justices with different leanings and different interpretive theories, has 
overturned previous Supreme Court decisions in order to establish or abolish rights that a 
previous version of the Court had either denied or affirmed.  
 Looking at the cases of Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, neither has 
been overturned by a new decision of the Supreme Court, but that does not mean that 
there have not been opposing judicial decisions on these cases. In order to get to the 
Supreme Court, cases must first pass through several levels of state or other federal 
courts. These two cases came to the Supreme Court from the Federal Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth and Second Circuits, respectively, and both of these courts ruled that state 
statutes prohibiting physician assisted suicide were unconstitutional before the Supreme 
Court reversed their decisions (Keown, 1997).  
 In addition to this, the majority released opinion of the Court is not the only 
opinion that is relevant to examine. While neither of these two cases had dissenting 
opinions, both had several concurring opinions. While the majority opinion of the 
Supreme Court may represent the official ruling, concurring opinions are still very 
important in that they show how other Justices got to the same conclusion for different 
reasons, thus offering better insight to their thought process’ and opinions. In examining 
the concurring opinions in both of these cases, it becomes clear that even the Supreme 
Court’s opinion on assisted suicide is not quite as cut and dry as it would seem.  
 In crafting their concurring opinions on these two cases, five of the nine Supreme 
Court Justices suggested the possibility of supporting a right to die in the future (Fraser & 
Walters, 2000), some more obviously than others. For example, in her concurring 
opinion, Justice O’Connor said that these statute challenges were facial challenges, and 
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therefore didn’t require her to decide if a constitutional interest existed in a person 
controlling the circumstances of their own death in this case, and Justice Stevens even 
went so far as to say that “an interest in hastening death was sometimes entitled to 
constitutional protection” (Keown, 1997). These decisions also did not ban states from 
passing laws in their own legislatures to allow for assisted suicide on a state by state basis 
(Fraser & Walters, 2000). Overall, while the Supreme Court unanimously held that these 
two particular statutes were not in violation of the Constitution, even some of the Justices 
who decided on this weren’t adamant on a complete ban of assisted suicide, and left the 
possibility open for future evaluation. 
With all of this in mind, more is needed to determine the potential legality of 
assisted suicide than previous Supreme Court decisions. The United States Constitution 
and its broader ideas need to be examined. It should be noted that in addition to 
everything else that has been said about the previously discussed Supreme Court cases, 
when the Court decided on the issue of Washington v. Glucksburg, they defined their 
question and constitutional analysis in terms of whether or not there was constitutional 
validity to a rule against receiving assistance in dying in general instead of carving out a 
specific population of competent, terminally ill adults to receive special and different 
consideration (Kaverny, 1997). Going forward in it’s examination of the Constitution, 
this paper will look at the issue in the opposite way. As was stated earlier, this is not an 
attempt to argue that all United States citizens have a right to commit suicide and receive 
assistance in doing so. It is an argument that a certain group of people who meet certain 
conditions of pain and suffering have a right to assistance in dying, and the following 
constitutional analysis is only made in application to these types of people. 
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The most obvious place to look is the Fourteenth Amendment, as this is the 
amendment used in the arguments of both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. 
Quill.  The part of the Fourteenth Amendment that is relevant to this discussion reads, 
“...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” 
(U.S. Const. amend. XIV). To simplify it, the main rights addressed in the Fourteenth 
Amendment are a liberty interest of the individual to have a right to choose, and a 
protection of equality among all people subject to the laws of the United States.  
 A person’s individual interest in liberty and individual autonomy is one of the 
most clear cases for assisted dying that can be made from the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The idea of individual autonomy can often be misconstrued into a much more negative 
idea than it is, especially when it comes to assisted dying. When the argument is made 
that people should have the right to assistance in dying because of individual liberty and 
autonomy, there isn’t a broad argument being made that people should be able to do 
whatever they want as long as it isn’t harming someone else in the process. When it 
comes to assisted, dying, the underlying principle of the autonomy argument is actually 
the idea that “...’every competent person has the right to make momentous personal 
decisions which invoke fundamental religious or philosophical convictions… Death is 
seen as among the most significant events of a person’s life…’ [and it] should ‘reflect our 
own convictions… not the convictions of others forced on us in our most vulnerable 
moment’” (Steinbock, 2005).  
 While the idea of individual autonomy is a compelling one, there is a common, 
constitutionally based argument that even if a person does have a liberty interest in 
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something, that interest must be weighed against relevant state interests, and in the case 
of assisted suicide, the state has a relevant interest in the preservation of life (Destro, 
1994). What is often ignored, however, is that the preservation of human life has changed 
drastically over the years. People used to die from illness or injury significantly quicker, 
but advances in modern medicine have lead to people lingering in life for longer and 
longer, the dying process often becoming “...protracted, painful, and undignified” (Fraser 
& Walters, 2000). This significant prolonging of life changes the factors that should be 
considered in examining a state’s interest in the preservation of life. As one American 
judge has put it:  
...what interest can the state possibly have in requiring the prolongation of 
a life that is all but ended? Surely the state’s interest lessens as the 
potential for life diminishes… And what business is it one the state to 
require the continuation of agony when the result is imminent and 
inevitable?... The greatly reduced interest of the state in preserving life 
copeis [sic] the answer to these questions: ‘None’. (Steinbock, 2005, p. 
236) 
The second part of the relevant section of the Fourteenth Amendment addresses the 
inherent right of United States citizens to equality under the law. At first glance, it may 
seem that allowing for assisted suicide is not an equality issue, because as long as it is 
universally recognized in one way or the other, everyone is being treated the same. A 
deeper look at the issue, however, shows that there are multiple inherent equality issues 
with not allowing for terminally ill patients to seek assistance in dying 
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 There are two main equality issues that can be discussed in regards to assisted 
dying that apply to the United States, the first being class inequality. It would seem that 
this would not apply to assisted dying, because if it is not allowed for all, how could there 
be an inequality in how different classes have access to it? Reality, however, shows that 
“More than 20% of physicians in both the United States and Australia admit to taking 
deliberate action to end the lives of particular patients”, and because more privileged 
members of society are more likely to have a relationship of trust with a doctor willing to 
discreetly handle the issue, it in almost indubitable that the wealthy are the ones who 
benefit from this while the poorer population does not (Fraser & Walters, 2000). 
 The second main equality issue harkens back to the earlier discussed Vacco v. 
Quill decision: a discrimination against terminally ill patients based on what illness they 
have. Patients who have a terminal illness and are being kept alive with the assistance of 
machines are able to request that treatment be removed so that they can die, yet 
terminally ill patients who are just as sick but not being kept alive by machines cannot 
request that a treatment be added so that they can die (Fraser & Walters, 2000). One of 
the main reasons this argument has been rejected by those who examine it is the idea that 
when a person removes treatment, they are being killed by the underlying disease and not 
necessarily by suicide. However, as was mentioned earlier, before this argument failed in 
the Supreme Court, it succeeded in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Ninth 
Circuit didn’t buy into this technicality. They instead presented the example of 
withdrawing a gastrostomy tube, in which the patient would actually die of starving 
themselves to death without the tube instead of the actual underlying condition (Fraser & 
Walters, 2000). In the end, they concluded that there was “‘...no ethical or 
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constitutionally recognizable difference between a doctor’s pulling the plug on a 
respirator and his prescribing drugs which will permit a terminally ill patient to end his 
own life’” (Fraser & Walters, 2000). While this particular issue of equality may have 
been rejected by the Supreme Court, it can’t be denied that the argument and logic behind 
it is extremely compelling. 
 One final piece of interesting evidence comes from, of all places, the legal status 
of the death penalty in the United States. It’s an interesting thought to ponder, and brings 
up the complex issue of autonomy versus the power of the government. In the United 
States, a healthy person can have their life taken against their will so long as due process 
is followed, but a person who is genuinely suffering, already dying, and wants their life to 
end cannot receive assistance in dying. The Fourteenth Amendment says that the 
government may deprive a person of life so long as due process of the law is followed. If 
the government can follow due process in the court system to end the life of an unwilling 
person, why can’t an individual, autonomous person follow a different type of due 
process, filled with safeguards, double checks, board reviews, and more, to receive 
assistance in dying from a doctor? If a due process procedure is developed to ensure that 
assisted suicide is carried out in an ethical way that is truly in line with the patient’s 
wishes, why wouldn’t assisted suicide line up with the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment? 
 Overall, while different things can be said by different judges and different 
analysts, it is clear from looking at the Constitution, court decisions, and the general 
framework of legality in America that, with the right safeguards and procedures in place, 
a right to assistance in dying can be found in the United States Constitution. While the 
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right Supreme Court has not yet sat on the bench and the right case has not yet come 
before them to make them properly address the issue, a time is steadily approaching when 
assistance in dying will be recognized as a right in America. 
 
COMMON OBJECTIONS TO ASSISTED DYING 
 With being such a debate-prone subject, the arguments against the legalization of 
assisted suicide encompass topics much broader than law and the United States 
Constitution. While many of these objections may not carry the weight of constitutional 
objections, some have still been instrumental in helping to prevent assisted dying from 
being legalized. As such, addressing them as well is important. 
A Matter for States 
 As was mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court did not bar individual states from 
passing their own assisted dying legislation, so the argument could be made that a 
national legalization is not needed and assisted suicide regulations should simply be left 
to the individual states. On the surface, this sounds like a good idea. It allows for the 
legalization of assistance in dying while also not taking control away from states when it 
comes to regulating certain medical practices. However, it must also be recognized that 
leaving assisted dying policies entirely up to individual states will lead to a wide range of 
results, ranging from states that completely disallow it, to states that allow it with 
extremely strict regulations, to states that allow it with relatively loose regulations. This 
level of freedom in regulation could lead to many different issues with many different 
policies depending on how much or little an individual state choses to regulate. This 
difference in policy between states could also lead to people venue shopping across states 
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to try to find doctors that will most easily help them die, and the number of potential 
abuses that could arise from this are innumerable. A national, comprehensive, strict, and 
monitored policy is the best way to make sure that every United States citizen is treated 
equally and fairly while high standards are maintained throughout. 
Religion 
 Some of the more common objections to the legalization of assisted dying come 
from religion, and historically, “...laws against suicide and mercy killing have developed 
from religious doctrine…” (Steinbock, 2005). Any religious objections, however, are 
objectively irrelevant to arguments regarding the legalization of assisted dying in the 
United States. The very first part of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” (U.S. Const. Amend. I), guaranteeing 
American citizens a freedom of and from religion. While this means that those who 
oppose assisted dying for religious reasons do not have to use it as an option in their 
lives, it also means that other people cannot be denied the ability to receive assistance in 
dying simply because it goes against someone else’s religious beliefs.  
Potential for Abuse 
Another big and well vocalized objection to assisted dying is concerns over the 
potential that abuses could occur. While it is noble to worry about and try to protect 
vulnerable groups that could potentially be abused by a system that allows for assisted 
suicide, if the same logic were applied to other laws, no legislation would ever be passed. 
The reality is that someone will always find a loophole or a way to exploit almost any 
law, so instead of refusing to legalize assisted dying over concerns with abuse, attention 
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should be directed towards finding the best way to prevent abuse from occurring once it 
has been legalized. The best way to do so is to build into any law passed several layers of 
required safeguards and double checks in order to help ensure that anyone receiving 
assistance in dying is fully competent, understands the decision, and is making the 
decision freely. Nationalizing the legalization of assisted dying will also help with this 
goal because it will ensure that everyone is following the same detailed set of regulations 
instead of having variances by state. The types of safeguards and checks that can be used 
to best achieve this goal will be discussed later in this paper in the analysis of existing 
assisted dying regulations around the world.  
Understandably, the possibility that someone could abuse the system even with 
plenty of safeguards in place is a disturbing thought, but comfort can be taken in the 
knowledge that studies have shown that abuses of the assisted dying system are actually 
fairly rare to begin with. In a study examining the risk to vulnerable groups in the 
Netherlands and Oregon, two places where assisted dying is legal, it was found that the 
only group with a heightened risk was people with AIDS (Battin et al., 2007). In other 
categories that may be traditionally considered to vulnerable, such as women, people of 
color, the elderly, the poor, and the poorly educated, there was no evidence found that 
they had a heightened risk of being disproportionately impacted by assisted suicide 
(Battin et al, 2007). Other, more widespread, studies that included the United States, 
Canada, and European countries also found no evidence that vulnerable groups were 
receiving aid in dying more frequently than the general population (Emmanuel et al., 
2016). 
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Lack of Access to Palliative Care 
 Another argument raised against the legalization of assisted dying is problems 
with the palliative care system, with some arguing that assisted dying should only be 
allowed once quality palliative care is equally accessible to everyone (Barutta & 
Vollman, 2015). The main point of this argument is that if proper palliative care is not 
available to all, it is possible that people who could otherwise benefit from palliative care 
would instead chose assisted dying, which could lead to equality issues because typically 
it’s the economically disadvantaged who cannot afford palliative care (Barutta & 
Vollman, 2015). This argument, however, is flawed in its justification. To begin with, 
this argument is based on a concern that the economically disadvantaged will be 
disproportionately affected by assisted suicide, but as was mentioned earlier, studies have 
shown that vulnerable groups like the economically disadvantaged have not been 
disparately impacted by assistance in dying. And besides this, the reality is that assisted 
dying is more common among the affluent than the poor (Barutta & Vollman, 2015), so 
concerns that there will be a disproportionately high rate of assisted dying among the 
poor are simply unfounded. 
 However, even if these claims were well founded, there would still be a disturbing 
flaw in this argument. It is argued that because access to palliative care is not universal, 
legalizing assisted dying would lead to inequality in how people are able to manage pain 
and suffering, but not legalizing it would actually lead to greater inequality. If it so 
happened that the rich sought out relief from suffering through palliative care and the 
poor sought it out through assisted dying, at least both groups would still have access to 
some type of relief. But when assisted dying is not legal, the rich still have access to 
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palliative care, but the poor are left with no options for relief. Overall, to deny access to 
assistance in dying for this reason would be unnecessarily cruel, and while access to 
palliative care does need to improve, people shouldn’t be denied assistance in dying until 
that happens (Barutta & Vollman, 2015). 
The Hippocratic Oath 
 A final common objection given to the legalization of assisted dying is an appeal 
to the Hippocratic Oath taken by doctors that says to ‘do no harm’, however, an 
examination of the wording and origin of this oath shows that this type of appeal is a 
mistaken sentiment. To begin with, the roles and viewpoints of physicians at the time of 
the oath’s origin should be examined. In classical culture, the sanctity of human life that 
many espouse today actually was subservient to a belief that the free man had an inherent 
right to dispose of his life as he saw fit (Amundsen, 1978). In fact, many different 
philosophers and schools of thought allowed for and justified suicide, some even calling 
it “...an honorable alternative to hopeless illness” (Amundsen, 1978). Overall, assisting in 
suicide was actually fairly common among Greco-Roman physicians, and those who 
opposed it were in the minority (Amundsen, 1978). Drawing justification for the 
prohibition of assisted dying from a document coming from this time period is flawed. 
 In spite of the culture surrounding the Hippocratic Oath showing a classical 
acceptance of assistance in dying, the oath itself is still worth examining to see if an 
argument against assisted dying does, in fact, exist within it. The part of the oath that 
seems to most explicitly forbid assistance in dying is a passage that reads “I will not give 
a drug that is deadly to anyone if asked for it” (Van Hooff, 2004). On a surface level, this 
is clearly a promise by physicians to not assist patients in committing suicide, but it must 
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be remembered that the oath was not originally written in English, and translations can 
muddle meanings. The form of the words used in the original Greek show that in this 
statement, the person requesting the drug and the one who would receive it are not 
necessarily the same person, meaning that rather than an oath against assisting patients in 
dying, this is actually an oath to not murder a patient by secretly poisoning them at the 
request of a third party (Van Hoof, 2004).  
 Along the same vein, many would bring up the concept of “do no harm” from the 
Hippocratic Oath and say that a doctor assisting is dying is clearly a violation of this 
sentiment (Steinbock, 2005), but there is an inherent flaw in this argument. The concept 
of what constitutes a harm is extremely subjective. While one person could say that dying 
is inherently harmful, another could just as easily say that forcing a person to continue to 
live in a constant state of suffering is harmful. With this in mind, “The case against 
legalizing [physician assisted suicide] should not rest on the implausible assumption that 
death is never a benefit to the dying person” (Steinbock, 2005). 
 Though the Hippocratic Oath may have not proved a case against assisted suicide, 
it’s examination does raise an important question about doctors: What about doctors who 
are morally opposed to assisted dying? It can be generally agreed that the assisted dying 
process, by virtue of being a medical issue, would need to involve a doctor, so 
legalization of assisted dying would bring into conflict the actual practice of it and the 
doctors responsible for assisting who may view it as ethically wrong (Bosshard et al., 
2008). While a person’s personal conviction against assisted dying should in no way 
hinder another person from their right to assisted dying, it cannot be denied that it would 
be extremely emotionally taxing for a doctor who opposed assisted dying to have to bear 
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the responsibility of having helped end a life, and this type of trauma would be 
unacceptable. Fortunately, there is a solution to this problem. In a 2014 survey of 
physicians, it was found that 54% of US Physicians agreed that physician assisted suicide 
should be allowed (Emmanuel et al, 2016). With this in mind, it would be more than 
reasonable to only have doctors who agree with assisted suicide be responsible for 
assisting patients in dying, and patients could keep factors like this in mind when 
choosing physicians. 
 
INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS 
Having found constitutional justification for a right to assisted dying and having 
addressed many concerns associated with the practice, the next question that must be 
posed is how to move forward from here. The prospect of making a plan for the United 
States to move forward in legalization can seem daunting, but fortunately, there are other 
countries in the world that have already recognized this right and created legislation. 
While it is important that any plan for implementation in the United States is unique to 
the country and it’s specific set of rights and freedoms, looking to what other countries 
have done before can provide several ideas for possible safeguards and regulations, as 
well as an opportunity to look at any areas that leave room for abuse so that they can be 
gotten ahead of and avoided. 
In looking at international policies for assisted dying, it is important to understand 
the difference between voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide because as will be seen, 
some countries allow for only one or the other. Voluntary euthanasia is an act where “...a 
medical professional directly administers a substance that causes the death of the 
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patient…”, whereas in assisted suicide, “...a medical professional prescribes to a person a 
substance they can self-administer to cause death…” (Carter et al., 2018).  
The Netherlands 
 In 2002, the Netherlands became the first European country to formally 
decriminalize assisted dying (Bosshard et al., 2008). In this country, doctors cannot be 
prosecuted for helping a patient die or ending a patient’s life by request as long as 
statutory due care is exercised, meaning that “...the request is voluntary; the patient’s 
physical or mental suffering is unbearable with no prospect of improvement; the patient 
is fully informed about the prognosis; and doctor and patient have jointly concluded that 
no other reasonable solution exists” (Dyer et al., 2015). Unlike some other countries that 
will be seen, the Netherlands does allow for patients who are not terminally ill to receive 
assistance in dying so long as doctors determine that the suffering of living is great 
enough to warrant it (Bosshard et al., 2008), and it also allows for minors to be assisted in 
dying so long as those aged 12-15 have parental consent and those aged 16-17 have a 
parent involved in the decision (Dyer et al., 2015). 
 With allowing for the assistance of dying, the Netherlands has several safeguards 
in place in order to help prevent abuses from occurring. In order for a doctor to assist a 
patient in dying, they must first consult at least one other doctor who can state in writing 
that due care was followed in the process, and the Royal Dutch Medical Association has a 
network of independent medical assessors specifically for this purpose (Dyer et al., 
2015). In addition to this, in order to assist a patient in dying, there must be a close 
doctor-patient relationship, and the death must be reported by the doctor to the proper 
regional euthanasia review committee (Dyer et al., 2015).  
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Belgium 
 Similar to the Netherlands, Belgium made strides forward in legalizing assisted 
dying in 2002 by legalizing voluntary euthanasia (Dyer et al., 2015). Also similarly to the 
Netherlands, help with assisted dying in Belgium is restricted to doctors, and a certain 
criteria of due care must be met in order to carry out the assisted death (Bosshard et al., 
2008). Euthanasia by lethal injection can be carried out in patients “...who are mentally 
competent and have an incurable condition, including mental illness, that causes them 
constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering” (Dyer et al., 2015). The country’s 
legislation allows for legal voluntary euthanasia for children as well as adults, but 
euthanizing a child requires parental consent in addition to all other criteria (Dyer et al., 
2015). 
 The legal obligations that doctors must follow in Belgium are fairly similar to 
those in the Netherlands (Dyer et al., 2015), however there are some additional rules in 
place as well. If a patient requesting euthanasia is not in the final stages of their illness, 
“...the doctor must consult a second independent medical specialist, and at least a month 
must elapse between the patient’s written request and the act of euthanasia” (Dyer et al., 
2015). 
Luxembourg 
 Luxembourg is another European nation that moved to legalize assistance in 
dying in the late 2000’s by legalizing euthanasia and assisted suicide in 2009 (Dyer et al., 
2015). Unlike the Netherlands and Belgium, Luxembourg’s legislation only allows for 
adults to make the decision to receive help in ending their lives (Dyer et al., 2015). In 
order to be eligible for assistance in dying, patients must be “mentally competent adults 
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with a severe and incurable terminal condition, causing constant and unbearable physical 
or psychological suffering without prospects of improvement” (Dyer et al., 2015). 
Doctors who assist in the dying also must meet statutory due care requirements by 
consulting various groups and people in the process, including another independent 
medical specialist, the medical team of the patient, and a person who the patient has 
designated as a “person of trust”, and once the death has occurred, they must report it to 
the National Commission for Control and Assessment (Dyer et al., 2015). 
Canada 
 In 2016, Canada implemented a law known as MAID (Medical Assistance in 
Dying) that allowed for both voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (Carter 
et al., 2018). In order to receive assistance in dying, an adult person who is capable of 
making their own decisions and who has made a voluntary request must “...have a serious 
and incurable illness, [be] in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capacity or 
physical/psychological suffering intolerable to them…. and their death [must be] 
reasonably foreseeable…” (Carter et al., 2018). There were also several safeguards 
intentionally set up for this process, including a requirement that two separate, 
independent medical professionals must write out opinions confirming that the patient 
meets the requirements to receive assistance in death, and a requirement that there be at 
least a ten day period between the initial request for MAID and the second medical 
review (Carter et al., 2018). 
Columbia 
 Columbia is the only country in South America to have decriminalized assisted 
dying. In 1997, the Columbian Constitutional Court decriminalized mercy homicide, but 
22 
 
 
 
no specifications were given by the Ministry of Health in terms of how these killings 
could occur legally until 2015 (Dyer et al., 2015). With regulations now in place, 
voluntary euthanasia is allowed in Columbia to “...adult patients with a terminal disease 
that produces severe pain and suffering that cannot be relieved” (Dyer et al., 2015). In 
addition to a patient consciously requesting to have assistance in dying, the process of 
receiving euthanasia must be supervised by not only a medical specialist, but also a 
lawyer and a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist (Dyer et al., 2015). 
It is estimated that about 20 illegal cases of voluntary euthanasia occurred in 
Columbia while legalization was still in limbo between the court decision and the actual 
passage of legislation (Dyer et al., 2015), pointing to the importance of actually 
legislating the legalization of assisted dying rather than waiting for a court decision. Once 
everything was official, however, Ovidio González became the first to use it, and prior to 
his death he shared the haunting sentiment that “‘I want to die while I’m alive and not 
once I’m dead’” (Dyer et al., 2015). 
Switzerland 
 Switzerland is a different case to other countries that allow for assistance in dying 
because there isn’t much regulation in terms of requirements for an assisted suicide to 
occur. Rather than having a lot of detailed legislation, Switzerland simply made it so that 
assisted suicide, but not euthanasia, is not illegal as long as the assistance is given 
without any selfish motives (Bosshard et al., 2008). Unlike many other countries, there is 
no requirement that the one assisting has to be a doctor, or that a doctor even has to be 
involved at all, leading to the formation of Swiss right-to-die groups (Bosshard et al., 
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2008), and there is no requirement that the person receiving assistance have a terminal 
illness or be a Swiss citizen (Dyer et al., 2015).  
 Because of the lack of legislation and restrictions on assisted suicide in 
Switzerland, a new phenomenon has arisen in the country known as suicide tourism. 
Suicide tourism occurs when people from other countries come to Switzerland for the 
sole purpose of being able to commit suicide (Gauthier et al., 2015). While right-to-die-
organizations do work with willing doctors so that they can prescribe the lethal 
medication to the person requesting assistance in dying, there is no physician-patient 
relationship required for this to occur, making it easier for outsiders to use services in 
Switzerland to die (Steck et al., 2013). Each right-to-die-organization has its own set of 
rules and procedures, but four out of the six in Switzerland allow foreign people to use 
their services (Dyer et al., 2015), and this type of access has lead to an increase in rates of 
suicide tourism and the number of countries from which people are coming to 
Switzerland in order to die (Gauthier et al., 2015).  
Australia 
 
 Unlike most other countries that have legalized assistance in dying, Australia has 
only legalized assisted dying in certain parts of the country instead of having a uniform 
policy throughout the country as a whole. Currently, assisted dying is allowed in the state 
of Victoria, and it was allowed for a brief time in the Northern Territory before being 
overturned by the Commonwealth Parliament (Duckett, 2017) 
 Though the assisted dying legislation in the Northern Territory has been 
overturned, it’s specific criteria and procedures can still be analyzed in a useful manner. 
In order to receive aid in dying under this legislation, a patient had to have a condition 
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causing severe pain or suffering that could not be cured by a measure acceptable to the 
patient and that would cause death (although no time frame was specified) (Duckett, 
2017). The patient must have been at least 18 and sound of mind so as to make the 
decision freely and voluntarily, not have suffered from treatable clinical depression at the 
time of the request, and have waited a seven day notice after their initial request for aid in 
dying, plus another 48 hour delay (Duckett, 2017). In order to ensure these measures 
were met, three medical professionals had to certify the decision, including a psychiatrist 
and an expert in the patient’s illness (Duckett, 2017).  
 Victoria’s Voluntary Assisted Dying Act involved a lot more planning and detail. 
It was passed after 30 years of research in 2017, and was implemented in 2019 (Duckett, 
2017). In order to receive assistance in dying, patients in Victoria must have a terminal 
condition that is expected to cause death in six months or less (or in the case of 
neurodegenerative conditions, twelve months or less), be suffering in a way that cannot 
be relieved and made tolerable, be 18 or older, make the request voluntarily, and go 
through a two stage request process where the second stage is at least nine days after the 
first request (Duckett, 2017). In order to certify this process, two or three medical 
practitioners must be involved in order to determine whether the patient’s condition 
meets the required criteria and to make sure the patient has the decision-making capacity 
to make such a decision (Duckett, 2017). This legislation also has additional safeguards 
in place, including penalties for pressuring someone to decide on assisted dying, and a 
prohibition on doctors initiating a conversation about assisted dying with their patients 
(Duckett, 2017).  
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The United States 
 While assisted suicide may not yet be legal in the entirety of the United States, it 
is similar to Australia in that certain states have legalized the practice. Oregon was the 
first state to legalize assisted dying, with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act going into 
effect in 1997 (Dyer et al., 2015). In Oregon, a mentally sound adult resident of that state 
can be prescribed life-ending drugs for the purpose of assisted suicide if they have a 
terminal disease with a life expectancy of six months or less (Dyer et al., 2015). A 
second, consulting physician must confirm the diagnosis and that the patient meets the 
criteria, and if either doctor determines that a psychiatric disease like depression is 
playing a role in the patient’s decision, the patient is referred to counselling and the 
decision is put on hold (Dyer et al., 2015). Even if all criteria for assisted suicide are met, 
a patient must still go through a fifteen day waiting period before drugs can be prescribed 
(Ziegler & Bosshard, 2007). In addition to this 15 day waiting period between oral 
requests, patients must also submit a written request at least 48 hours prior to receiving 
their prescription that is witnessed by two people who can attest that the patient is 
mentally capable, making the request voluntarily, and not being coerced, one of which 
may not be a relative or heir of the patient or an employee of the medical facility where 
the patient is receiving care (Oregon Death With Dignity Act, 1994). During the process, 
the physician must document everything to show that regulations are being followed and 
submit this for review, and the state department reviewing said reports will release an 
annual statistical report with this information (Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 1994). 
 Once this legislation was passed in Oregon, it’s implementation actually ended up 
being somewhat similar to in Switzerland, except in a more regulated way. Since no 
26 
 
 
 
doctor or hospital is forced to partake in the assisted suicide process, most assisted 
suicides are facilitated through right-to-die groups that help to inform patients of end of 
life decisions and give them information on how to navigate the process and find doctors 
willing to help them (Ziegler & Bosshard, 2007). This is not an Oregon-specific process, 
however, as right-to-die groups such as Compassion and Choices are nationwide and 
provide services to most states, helping patients navigate either assisted dying or other 
end of life care options depending on what their state allows for (Ziegler & Bosshard, 
2007).  
 Washington became the second state to legalize assisted suicide in 2009 with the 
implementation of the Washington Death with Dignity Act, and the requirements in this 
act are essentially the same as Oregon’s (Washington Death with Dignity Act, 2008). 
Vermont followed Washington with the Patient Choice and Control at the End of Life 
Act in 2013 which was, again, very similar to the Oregon legislation. However, there is a 
difference in that the two witnesses to the written request by a patient must both be non-
interested parties instead of just one of them (Patient Choice and Control at the End of 
Life Act, 2013).  
In 2015, two US States legalized assistance in dying. Colorado enacted the 
Colorado End-of-Life Options Act which is essentially the same as Oregon’s legislation, 
except it does not require state review or an annual statistical report (Colorado End-of-
Life Options Act, 2015). California also legalized assisted suicide with the End of Life 
Option Act which is very similar to the Oregon legislation. Unlike Oregon, though, 
California requires that the patient fill out and execute one final form of attestation within 
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the 48 hours prior to self-administering the prescribed aid-in-dying drug (End of Life 
Option Act, 2015).  
The next to legalize assisted suicide was the District of Columbia in 2016 with the 
Death with Dignity Act of 2016. It is essentially the same as the legislation in Oregon, 
just with a few more regulation for pharmacists regarding who the medication can be 
released to and a requirement to inform the attending physician when the drug is picked 
up (Death with Dignity Act of 2016, 2016). After the District of Columbia was Hawaii in 
2018 with the Our Care, Our Choice Act, and this act has a few more key differentiators 
than many of the prior listed acts. Instead of a 15 day waiting period, Hawaii requires a 
20 day waiting period, and instead of only requiring counseling if the attending or 
consulting physician deems it necessary, Hawaii requires that all patients receive 
counseling from a psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinical social worker in order determine 
that the patient is not suffering from depression or any other illness that may impact his 
or her decision (Our Care, Our Choice Act, 2018).  
 The two most recent states to legalize assisted suicide have been Maine and New 
Jersey in 2019. Like some other acts mentioned, the Maine Death with Dignity Act 
contains essentially the same requirements as the Oregon Legislation (Maine Death with 
Dignity Act, 2019). New Jersey’s Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act is also 
essentially the same as Oregon’s legislation in terms of requirements (Medical Aid in 
Dying for the Terminally Ill Act, 2019).  
While assisted suicide is technically legal in Montana, it is a unique case. In 2009, 
the Montana Supreme Court ruled in the case of Baxter v. Montana that a terminally ill 
patient’s consent would be a valid defense to any murder charges brought against a 
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doctor for assisting a patient in dying, so a physician prescribing lethal medication to a 
patient that wants to die would not be in violation of state homicide laws (Lathum, 2015). 
Unlike other states, however, Montana has no legislation regulating the assisted suicide 
practice because even though it has been legalized through the courts, the state legislature 
has continually stalled any and all bills attempting to regulate it since the decision was 
made (Lathum, 2015). 
Critical Analysis 
The first ever assistance in dying legislation was passed by the Northern Territory 
of Australia in 1995, and though, as has been mentioned, it was overturned by a bill in the 
Commonwealth Parliament in 1997 (Duckett, 2017), it’s legacy still lives on. The 
framework of the legislation passed in the Northern Territory created a precedent that can 
be seen in much of the legislation that has been passed in other countries since, including 
a terminal criterion (the patient will die from their condition), a suffering criterion 
(unbearable suffering and/or no means of alleviation), an autonomy criterion (mentally 
competent, adult, without pressure, etc), a clarity criterion (a clear and explicit request 
was made, potentially with a waiting period), and an independent verification criterion 
(the patient’s eligibility is verified by independent medical practitioners) (Duckett, 2017). 
It is through its effectiveness in addressing these criteria that other legislation can be most 
effectively analyzed.  
The Unique Case of Switzerland 
 Before discussing the aforementioned criteria, the unique case of Switzerland’s 
decriminalization of assisted suicide must first be discussed. Unlike the rest of the 
countries and locations examined, Switzerland has failed to regulate the practice of 
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assisted suicide within its borders other than making it so that the practice is legal so long 
as the one giving assistance does not have selfish motives (Bosshard et al., 2008). While 
individual right-to-die groups have developed their own sets of policies and procedures, 
and many of them are fairly comprehensive, this overall lack of monitoring and 
guidelines for acceptable practice leaves the practice of assisted dying in Switzerland 
open to a nearly infinite number of possible abuses. This possibility for abuse is very 
important to keep in mind, and serves as a stark warning that a failure to create detailed 
and comprehensive legislation when regulating assisted dying could lead to a slew of 
problems in a country.  
 This warning should and will be kept in mind going forward in this paper, but the 
lack of regulation for assisted dying in Switzerland means that beyond the 
acknowledgement of the potential for abuse, there’s not much more that can be done in 
terms of policy analysis. Because of this, Switzerland will not be further discussed in the 
following analysis sections that aim primarily to discuss holes and successes in different 
countries’ established criterion for the practice of assisted dying.  
The Terminal Criterion 
 
 Of the countries and locations discussed, there are two besides Switzerland that 
do not contain a requirement that the patient seeking assistance in dying have a terminal 
condition: the Netherlands and Belgium This, for the first time, raises the question of 
whether or not a terminal condition should be a necessary criterion in creating legislation 
for assisted suicide. Should a physical illness have to be terminal in order for a patient to 
receive assistance in dying? Or, going a step further like Belgium explicitly has, should 
mental illness be a valid illness to receive assistance in dying? 
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 Much of the earlier discussed legal argument for the legalization of assisted dying 
hinges on the idea that the government should have no legitimate interest in prolonging a 
life that is going to end shortly, and in cases like that, a person who is dying anyway 
should have the right to make that death be in a dignified way on their own terms. 
Further, when certain Supreme Court Justices implied the possibility of allowing for a 
right to assisted suicide in the future, the implication was geared towards exceptional 
cases involving a specific class of people with features such as incredible pain, loss of 
dignity, and/or a terminal illness (Kaverny, 1997). If assistance in dying is not restricted 
to those with terminal illnesses, the legislation is significantly less likely to find 
constitutional support. So to answer these two questions simply: allowing someone 
without a terminal illness to receive assistance in dying would unravel the argument for 
legalization too much to allow it to happen in the creation of legislation for America.  
The Suffering Criterion 
  The suffering criterion for the allowance of assisted suicide is fairly uncontested 
no matter which country or locality is being discussed. While wording does differ a bit by 
legislation, it can be said that, generally, in order for a person to receive assistance in 
dying, they must be suffering to a degree that is unbearable and has no options for relief 
or improvement that are acceptable to the patient. The only significant question raised in 
examining the suffering criterion is whether or not psychological suffering should be 
taken into account in addition to physical suffering, because some legislation explicitly 
mentions it and some does not. Allowing for a patient to receive assistance in dying 
purely based on psychological suffering would veer far too close to the idea of allowing 
for assistance in dying due to mental illness, an idea that has already been discussed and 
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rejected as an option for America. In spite of this, though, the weight of psychological 
suffering when it comes to dealing with a terminal illness cannot be discounted from the 
total suffering experience. Because of this, psychological suffering should be allowed to 
be included in the suffering criterion of legislation as long as it is taken into account in 
combination with physical suffering as a part of a holistic approach to examining 
suffering. 
The Autonomy Criterion 
 The autonomy criterion is one of the most important to examine in creating 
legislation for assistance in dying because it is the criterion that aims to ensure that a 
patient choosing to receive assistance in dying is mentally competent and is doing so 
without outside pressure. While much of ensuring competency and lack of outside 
pressure is addressed more in the process of independent verification, reading through 
existing legislation raises two particularly interesting questions under the autonomy 
criterion: Should minors be able to receive assistance in dying, and should euthanasia, 
assisted suicide, or both be permitted? 
 As is seen above, there are only two places in the world that allow for minors to 
receive assistance in dying: the Netherlands and Belgium. Both of these places require a 
parent to be involved in the decision of assisted dying for minors, and this stipulation that 
minors cannot make the decision on their own contributes to the question of whether 
minors are capable of making truly autonomous decisions when it comes to assisted 
dying. Belgium actually did not allow for minors to recieve assistance in dying when it 
first legalized the practice of euthanasia, and it wasn’t until ten years later that the 
stipulation was added via an amendment to the original act (Saad, 2017). It is posited that 
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part of the reason for this was a fear that including such a measure would be so 
controversial that it would prevent the act from passing altogether (Saad, 2017).  
 It would seem that even in countries where assisted dying is legal for minors, the 
demand is minimal, which raises the question of how necessary it is to include minors in 
this type of legislation, especially considering how polarizing the topic can be (Saad, 
2017). If the end goal is legalizing assisted dying, it must be asked whether or not it’s 
worth risking the entire legislation over something so controversial when it isn’t even in 
high demand. In the end, since this would be America’s first ever nationalized legislation 
for assisted dying, it is a safe bet to follow the lead of Belgium and start out with a more 
restrictive law that only allows for adults to receive assistance in dying. Then once that 
baseline has been established and the first step has been made, legislation can be 
modified at a later time if observation and analysis deem it necessary.  
 Moving on to the second question, the query of whether assisted suicide, 
euthanasia, or both should be included in legalization is also an autonomy issue. Because 
euthanasia involves the lethal drug being administered to a patient while assisted suicide 
involves a patient administering the lethal drug to themselves, assisted suicide provides 
one final moment for the patient to truly make their own decision regarding whether they 
want to go through with the assisted dying process or not. Assisted suicide allows for an 
extra safeguard to ensure that a patient’s decision is autonomous, and this addition makes 
it the better choice for legislation in comparison to euthanasia.  
The Clarity Criterion 
 The clarity criterion seeks to ensure that a patient’s request for assisted suicide is 
one that is made clearly and explicitly. In looking at steps that can be taken in order to 
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ensure that such a decision is made with full understanding and clarity, the idea of 
waiting periods between an initial request for assisted dying and the actual death must be 
examined. Most countries do require some specific waiting period, but a few exceptions 
to this rule do beg the question of whether this is necessary or not. Fortunately, like the 
assisted suicide versus euthanasia question, this one can be very quickly resolved by 
simply asking which answer will lead to the most safeguards being in place. With this in 
mind, having a designated waiting period quickly becomes the better option as opposed 
to not having one because it gives patients built in time to really reflect on their decision 
to ensure that that it is what they really want.  
The Independent Verification Criterion 
Examining the independent verification criterion in other countries is especially 
important because the independent verification process is where many of the safeguards 
and double checks come in that help to prevent abuses from occurring. Every country or 
locality that has legalized or regulated assisted dying has a requirement for independent 
verification by at least one other medical practitioner in order to verify the patient’s 
eligibility for assistance in dying. However, beyond this basic similarity, there are many 
differences between countries in regards to the independent verification criterion. 
 Unlike other countries, the Netherlands and Luxembourg require that all instances 
of assisted dying be reported to a national review board once the death has occurred 
(Dyer et al., 2015). This raises the question of whether a review board like this would be 
good for the United States. The answer, once again, is easily found by determining which 
option would provide for more safeguards to be in place. Having a national review board 
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will be an extra layer of protection to help increase chances than any issues or instances 
of corruption are caught early and stopped before they become bigger problems. 
 Another key point that separates countries is who is involved in the independent 
verification process. Beyond the verification by a second, independent medical 
practitioner, some countries require independent verification from additional sources, 
including psychiatrists, an expert in the field of the patient’s illness, or even a lawyer. In 
looking at the types of people who could be involved in independent verification, the one 
that stands out as absolutely necessary is the psychiatrist. It has been shown that 
“Depression is strongly associated with a desire for hastened death in terminally ill 
people…” (Price, 2015), so in order to ensure that the decision to receive assistance in 
dying is truly autonomous, it must be ensured that depression or some other mental 
illness isn’t clouding the patient’s judgement. 
 Another interesting point that can be made on the topic of independent 
verification is the possibility of involving judges in the process. Judges could play an 
important role in assisted dying by making the final decision of whether a person may 
receive assistance in dying after hearing the case of everyone involved, including the 
doctors and psychiatrists involved in independent verification process and the patient 
themself, and deciding whether all requirements for assisted dying have been met from a 
legal perspective (Castelló, 2009). This, once again, serves as an extra layer of protection 
to ensure that regulations are being followed and abuses are not occurring.  
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A PLAN FOR THE LEGALIZATION OF ASSISTED SUICIDE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 With all of this analysis done, the information gathered can now be applied into a 
plan for the creation of national assisted suicide legislation in the United States. Herein 
are the aspects that I deemed to be necessary in order to create the best possible plan for 
implementation of assisted dying in America. 
 To begin with the very basics, the United States should only allow for physician 
assisted suicide and not euthanasia, and the option of medically assisted suicide should 
only be available to mentally competent adults who have made the decision of their own 
free will. In order to be eligible for assisted suicide, a patient must have a terminal illness 
and, based on numbers from other existing legislation, their prognosis should put their 
life expectation at six months or less. In addition to having a terminal illness, the patient 
must be experiencing, due to that illness, physical and psychological suffering to an 
unbearable degree with no acceptable prospects of relief or improvement. 
 In addition to these eligibility criteria for patients to receive assistance in dying, 
any legislation passed should be passed with several required safeguards included in 
order to ensure that all standards are met and abuses aren’t occurring. To begin with, 
there should be a required waiting period between any patient’s initial request for 
assistance in dying and the day that they are officially prescribed the lethal medication. 
While the exact length of time for this waiting period can be adjusted and hammered out 
more precisely once legislation is being drafted, my recommendation is that this waiting 
period be no less than one week. Whether or not all of the criteria for assistance in dying 
have been met by a patient, including that they’re mentally competent, fully understand 
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what they are doing, and are doing it of their own free will, should be independently 
verified by both a second, independent medical practitioner and a psychiatrist. The 
patient’s meeting with these independent verifiers should be one-on-one in order to 
ensure there is no undue influence on the evaluation. Once the patient’s doctor, the 
independent medical practitioner, and the psychiatrist have all determined that the patient 
meets all eligibility requirements for receiving assistance in dying, the case should be 
presented before a judge, who will make the final determination of whether all eligibility 
requirements have been met from a legal standpoint. Finally, once the patient has died 
due to assisted suicide, their physician should report the death to a national review 
committee for review. 
 When creating legislation for the legalization of assisted dying, it is important that 
these many levels of safeguards are not brushed over or watered down. The entire 
purpose of having safeguards in place for such legislation is to “...attempt to restrict 
physician aid-in-dying to those it would genuinely benefit and to protect vulnerable 
persons for whom it might otherwise pose a risk of harm” (Gunderson & Mayo, 2000). 
The necessary aspects for legalization that have been identified in this plan serve this 
purpose to a tee. The recommended regulations and safeguards ensure that only a limited 
and deserving community will be able to receive assistance in dying instead of making it 
widely legal for everyone, and they ensure that several layers of protections are in place 
in order to help prevent and catch cases of abuse and possible corruption. The whole plan 
is based on a system similar to that of checks and balances, with different people from 
different backgrounds working together to ensure that no one person can abuse the 
system.  
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CONCLUSION 
In 2002, Diane Pretty was facing a terminal illness in the United Kingdom and 
wanted to receive assistance in dying because more than anything, she said that she 
wanted to have “‘... a quick death without suffering, at home surrounded by my family so 
that I can say goodbye to them’” (Steinbock, 2005). Instead, she developed fatal 
breathing difficulties, spent her final weeks experiencing pain and discomfort in spite of 
the use of palliative care, and finally slipped into a coma-like state, dying in the hospital 
in the way she feared and dreaded most (Steinbock, 2005). The United Kingdom, like the 
United States, does not allow for assistance in dying, and heartbreaking stories like 
Pretty’s exist across countries, seas, and cultures. The stories of those who long to die 
peacefully and are instead left to suffer for weeks on end until their inevitable deaths 
come are numerous, tragic, and highlight the need for change to happen. 
The possibility of assisted dying being legalized for the entirety of the United 
States is not quite as foreign and far off of a concept as one might believe. Though it 
would be easy to push this type of change off, the sooner this process begins, the better. 
The legalization of assisted suicide is much more than an argument on paper full of 
hypotheticals, small nit-picks, and inflated personal moral values. There are very real 
people who are suffering in very real ways who would immensely benefit from the 
legalization of assisted suicide, yet instead of taking steps to help them, America has 
brushed the problem under the rug for years. This paper has compiled a massive amount 
of important information about assisted suicide together, and it is the hope that this 
information will be used by legislators to make logically formed decisions about the 
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future of assisted dying in the United States so that this country can finally move beyond 
the veil of ignorance. 
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